Comments on the Reporters' Study of
Enterprise Responsibility for Personal
Injury

JERRY J. PHILLIPS*

This Article critiques the substantive law and damage proposals
of the Reporters' Study on Enterprise Liability, which was published in 1991 by the American Law Institute. Contraryto the Reporters' recommendations, the author proposes retaining the
consumer expectations test and strict liabilityfor product suppliers. He argues that it is not practical to shift medical malpractice
liability, as proposed by the Reporters,from doctors to hospitals.
In the area of damages, the authorproposes retainingthe rules of
recovery for pain and suffering, punitive damages, and the collateral source rules essentially as they are now, instead of adopting
the changes recommended by the Reporters. The author believes
that the tort system and trial by jury as they are presently constituted work well, and are not in need of the sort of drastic overhaul
recommended by the Reporters.
I.

INTRODUCTION

A two-volume study of tort law (the Study) was issued under the
auspices of the American Law Institute (ALl) on April 15, 1991.1
The Study was the culmination of approximately five years of work
by its reporters and advisers. It never received the imprimatur of the
ALl, and the project was subsequently abandoned by the ALI

Council.
The analysis and proposals in the Study are of special interest,
however, since they canvass most of the tort law "reforms" of the
* w.P. Toms Professor of Law, University of Tennessee.
1. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, REPORTERS' STUDY ON ENTERPRISE
PERSONAL INJURY (1991) [hereinafter ALI STUDY].

LIABILITY FOR

mid-1980s. No general proposal in the Study advocates the abandonment of tort law in favor of administrative compensation for injuries and governmental regulation of safety. Therefore, the Study
should be evaluated in the context of whether it constitutes a proposed improvement on the existing tort system, rather than whether
it provides a suitable alternative to that system.
The main thrust of the Study breaks down into two parts. One
branch (volume 2, section B) considers proposed changes in liability
standards, and the other (volume 2, section C) considers proposed
changes in rules governing the award of tort damages. This article
evaluates the merits of these proposed changes.2
II.

LIABILITY STANDARDS

A.

Product Defects

The Reporters for the Study propose that "[c]urrent law establishing strict liability for manufacturing defects should be retained,"
but that "the consumer expectations test for defining a product [design] defect should be discarded" in favor of a risk-utility test which
holds "a design to be defective only if there was a feasible alternative design," the costs of which do not outweigh the preventable
harm.3 The Reporters reject a design cost-benefit analysis that would
permit the jury to find product defectiveness based on a "balance" of
the "benefits against the hazards" of a product without considering
whether there is a safer alternative design available.4
The consumer expectations test, which forms the standard of liability under section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, has
been criticized as a basis for determining design defectiveness on two
primary grounds. First, the standard would preclude liability where
the danger is obvious, and second, the consumer has no expectations
as to how a complex design can be made safer."
The obvious-danger criticism proceeds on the assumption that a
2.

The first volume of the Study contains a wealth of background material used by

the Reporters in developing their recommendations in the second volume. Volume 2 con-

tains additional recommendations (§ B.3 concerning regulatory compliance, § D dealing
with environmental and other mass torts, and § E exploring tort alternatives such as

elective no-fault medical liability, contractual alternatives to tort, and methods of improving liability and social insurance) that are not dealt with in any detail in the present
comments. For an overview of the Study, including these additional recommendations,
see Steven D. Sugarman, A Restatement of Torts, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1163 (1992). See
also Jerry J. Phillips, Comments on the American Law Institute Study of Enterprise
Liability for Personal Injury (1991), on file with the Univervisty of Tennesee Law

School Library and as an exhibit to the 1991 annual proceedings of the American Law
Institute.
3. 2 ALI STUDY, supra note 1, at 81.
4.

Id. at 54.

5. See W.
ed. 1989).
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consumer cannot expect safety from a product that she knows is dangerous. But this assumption is unwarranted. A person may be unwillingly exposed to a product danger although she would prefer a
safer product. The trend toward not barring recovery as a matter of
law based on obviousness of danger 6 reflects a judicial understanding
that consumers are not in the best position to eliminate such dangers, and that the average person would prefer not to be exposed to
those dangers.
The alternative argument, that consumers have no expectations regarding the practically achievable safety level of a product design,
ignores the way in which jurors-as representatives of the ordinary
consumer-make their factual determinations. In some instances
their decisions are based on common knowledge, but in many more
their judgment must be informed by expert testimony.7 The ultimate
jury decision, however, is no less a lay or ordinary consumer determination when based on expert testimony than when based on common
knowledge.
The Reporters' rejection of the unreasonably-dangerous-per-se
method for determining design defectiveness supports their rejection
of the consumer expectations test. Under a per se approach, a jury
decides that a product's utility is outweighed by its danger without
regard to whether a safer product can be made.8 The jurors decide,
in other words, that the product should not be marketed, or that a
substitute product should be marketed. Such a determination reflects
community or ordinary consumer values and is surely justified in
cases of negligence or intentional misconduct on the part of the defendant. It may well be justified also in strict liability, where the
focus is on the product 9 and the defendant's misrepresentation.10
Products liability, particularly strict torts liability, originated in
implied warranty.1" The warranty of merchantability, with its key
requirement that goods be fit for the ordinary purposes for which
6. See, e.g., Holm v. Sponco Mfg., 324 N.W.2d 207 (Minn. 1982).
7. See Wheeler v. John Deere Co., 935 F.2d 1090, 1100-01 (10th Cir. 1991).
8. See JERRY J. PHILLIPS, PRODUCTS LIABILITY IN A NUTSHELL 18-19 (3d ed.
1988). The Louisiana per se rule was repealed by "tort reform" legislation. Products
Liability Act, 1988 La. Acts, No. 64, § 1 (current version at LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:2800.56 (West 1991)).
9. See Roach v. Kononen, 525 P.2d 125 (Or. 1974).
10. On the importance of express and implied representations of the product supplier as a basis for determining strict liability, see Marshall S. Shapo, A Representational Theory of Consumer Protection: Doctrine, Function and Legal Liability for
Product Disappointment, 60 VA. L. REV. 1109 (1974).
11. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. m (1965).

they are used, 2 reflects the consumer expectations test. A number of
states, by common law or statute, follow the consumer expectations
test for determining design defectiveness.13 It would be precipitous to
depart from this substantial line of precedent.
The Reporters state that "[c]urrent law establishing strict liability
for manufacturing defects should be retained," but that in the case
of design defects current law should be "substantially altered" by
discarding the consumer expectations test.1 ' Apparently the Reporters intend that the consumer expectations test be retained for determining manufacturing defects, and they concede that this test is one
of strict liability.
It is unclear why the Reporters think a bright line can be drawn
between manufacturing and design defects. Both types of defects
may be unintended, and both may be random in causing injury but
generic to a line of production. Conversely, both types of defects can
result from conscious design decisions-as to the type of material
used, the frequency of sample testing for product defect, and the
like.
More importantly, why do the Reporters think a bright line should
be drawn? Perhaps they think consumer expectations are more crystallized in the case of production defects than design. But when a
gun barrel explodes in a user-consumer's face, her expectations are
not determined by whether the explosion resulted from a production
or a design defect. Expert testimony will normally be required in any
event-to establish what went wrong, and to trace the defect to the
defendant. In some design defect cases, as well as manufacturing or
production defect cases, the fact of the accident may be sufficient to
establish defectiveness.
For design defects, the Reporters say,
the risk-utility test should hold a design to be defective only if there was a

feasible alternative design which would have avoided the injury in question
without materially altering the consumer's expected use and enjoyment of
the product, and then only if the costs of incorporating the new lprecaution

in the design do not outweigh the human and financial harms arising from
the injuries preventable by doing so. It would be helpful if courts explicitly
recognized that this approach to design defects (as well as the approaches

now followed in practice) is really a form of negligence rather than the
1
strict liability used for manufacturing defects. "

The Reporters apparently think the risk-utility test sounds in negligence, 6 la the Learned Hand formula in The T. J. Hooper. 6 The
parallel is not precise, however, and by no means required under a
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(c) (1978).
See M. STUART MADDEN, 1 PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6.7 (2d ed. 1988).
2 ALI STUDY, supra note 1, at 81.
Id.
60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932).
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strict liability analysis. Many courts instruct the jury to consider the
adequacy of the product, rather than the defendant's conduct, in a
strict liability case. Unless the Reporters are willing to disregard the
efficacy of jury instructions, such a jury charge can make a substantial difference between negligence and strict liability.
A critical distinction for purposes of strict liability in design is
when the availability of an alternative design is to be determined-the date of manufacture, or the date of trial. Strict liability
points to the date of trial. The issue in strict liability is whether a
product can be more safely designed, and not whether it should have
been. If it can be, as established by date-of-trial evidence of feasibility, then a design defect is established for purposes of strict
liability. 17
Federal Rule of Evidence 407, and its counterpart in many states,
look to post-manufacture design improvements to determine the feasibility of a safer design." Moreover, reference to date of manufacture knowledge and feasibility can be confusing on the issue of strict
liability, and adumbrates many complicated negligence issues as to
why the defendant did not design a safer product at the date of
manufacture. 9
The consumer expectations test looks to the date of trial. So does
the test of unreasonably dangerous per se. Breach of express warranty and tortious misrepresentation imply liability without regard to
whether a safer design is feasible, either at trial date or the date of
manufacture.? ° As the landmark strict liability case of Greenman v.
Yuba Power Products, Inc. 21 indicated, a product carries an implied
representation of safety by its presence on the market. Holding the
supplier to that implied representation as of the date of trial is what
strict products liability is designed to achieve.

17. See Dart v. Wiebe Mfg., 709 P.2d 876 (Ariz. 1985).
18. See In re Hawaii Federal Asbestos Cases, 665 F. Supp. 1454, 1457 (D. Haw.
1986), affld 960 F.2d 806 (9th Cir. 1992), stating that a "product's design is considered
at the time of trial not at the time of manufacture" in part because "Hawaii Rule of
Evidence 407 allows the jury to consider subsequent remedial measures as proof of a
dangerous defect." See also Roger C. Henderson, Admissibility of Remedial Measures,
64 NEB. L. REV. 1 (1985).
19. These points are well made in Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 447
A.2d 539 (N.J. 1982), and in Milton Katz, The Function of Tort Liability in Technology Assessment, 38 U. CIN. L. REV. 587 (1969).
20. Crocker v. Winthrop Lab., 514 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. 1974).
21. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).

B.

Inadequate Warnings

One of the most intractable areas of products law involves liability
for failure to warn and for inadequate warnings. A warning or failure to warn is not susceptible to bright line rules of adequacy or
inadequacy, although the Reporters attempt to formulate such rules.
The determination of the need for and the adequacy of warnings is
peculiarly a matter of ordinary consumer expectations.
The Reporters appear to accept the idea, which is recognized by a
few courts,22 that a warning should be "fully exculpatory only for
products whose manufacture or design cannot be improved." 2 a This
position accords with the widely recognized principle that obviousness of danger does not bar recovery as a matter of law, but
rather goes to the issue of consumer misconduct.24 A warning at best
serves only to make a danger obvious.
This forthright position of the Reporters is rendered ambiguous by
their subsequent statement that "[c]onsideration should be given to
requiring risk level warnings even for potentially defective products."' 25 Such a warning would only serve as an added protection for
the prudent user. But why should the supplier be required to warn,
rather than redesign, a defective product?
The other warning recommendations point toward an exclusion or
restriction of the jury's role in warning cases. The Reporters propose
that compliance with "specific government regulations respecting the
form and content of product warnings should be sufficient to establish the adequacy of the warning for purposes of tort law."'2 6 They
propose that "use of expert testimony concerning warning adequacy
should be much encouraged, if not required. 27 And they state that
"[c]onsideration should be given to the creation of a uniform vocabulary for expressing risk level warnings."28
The regulatory preemption proposal reflects a recent trend toward
finding implied statutory or regulatory preemption of common law
tort actions. 29 The trend is against the weight of established law3"
and disregards the political-compromise nature of most government
safety regulation. It represents a conservative swing of the judiciary
22.
& Co. v.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

E.g., Uloth v. City Tank Corp., 384 N.E.2d 1188 (Mass. 1978); Sturm, Ruger
Day, 594 P.2d 38 (Alaska 1979).
2 ALI STUDY, supra note 1, at 81.
See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
2 ALI STUDY, supra note 1, at 82.
Id. at 81.
Id.
Id. at 82.
See JERRY J. PHILLIPS & D. SULLIVAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 7.09A (Supp.

1992).
30. FOWLER V. HARPER, ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS
& Supp. 1991).

§ 17.6 at n.71 (2d ed. 1986
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that seems to reflect political rather than judicious analysis."1
The "creation of a uniform vocabulary for expressing risk level
warnings" also points toward governmental or judicial preemption of
the jury's role in determining warning adequacy. The purpose of creating a "uniform vocabulary," or of complying therewith, is to establish a legal norm.
The Reporters' recommendation that the "use of expert testimony
concerning warning adequacy should be much encouraged, if not required," is ironic in view of their own recognition of the pitfalls of
expert testimony 32 and the general attack today on its widespread
use in tort law.13 Moreover, the need for warnings, and their adequacy or inadequacy, are matters generally within the common
knowledge of lay jurors. To require expert testimony in such cases
would only add to the expense of such litigation and to the possible
confusion of outcome.
Many courts today describe the duty to warn-like the duty to
design safely-as a duty based on standards of due care, rather than
strict liability. 34 The Reporters' stance on this issue is not clear.
Their statement, however, that "courts should give more deference to
warnings whose content reflects current expert opinion about risk
communication" 35 suggests that they incline toward strict liability in
the context of warnings. "Current" opinion reflects date of trial
knowledge and thus is not controlled by what the supplier knew or
should have known at the date of sale.
The tendency today of courts and commentators to shift warning
and design cases away from strict liability and toward a negligence
standard36 has many unfortunate consequences. The interrelation of
warning and design with misrepresentation and production defect
31. The Reporters devote a separate chapter, vol. 2. ch. 3, to the effect of regulatory compliance in general and conclude, at page 110, that such compliance either should
be an absolute defense, or that it should create "a rebuttable presumption or strong and
substantial evidence that the defendant's actions or products were not at fault" and
should "preclude the award of any punitive damages." This sanguine view of regulatory
compliance jars with their conclusion in vol. 1, at page 248, that to date "shortcomings in
the performance of regulatory agencies have been substantial."
32. See 2 ALI STUDY, supra note 1, at 332-51.
33. As exemplified by the populist writing of PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM (1991).
34. See MADDEN, supra note 13, at § 10.1.
35. 2 ALI STUDY, supra note 1, at 81 (emphasis

added).
36. See James A. Henderson & Aaron D. Twerski, A Proposed Revision of Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1513 (1992);
William Powers Jr., A Modest Proposalto Abandon Strict Products Liability, 1991 U.
ILL. L. REV. 639.

cases, which are typically tried on a strict liability basis, is ignored.
The fact that non-manufacturing suppliers, such as wholesalers and
retailers, will usually not be found responsible except in strict liability is overlooked. The negligence standard that it points toward may
revert to all the strictures of 19th-century tort liability. The modern
law of products liability, which had its origin in warranty, is invited
to shift from a tort perspective back to one of warranty.
A great deal of criticism has been directed at the alleged disincentive to product innovation and development brought about by a strict
products liability regimen.37 This criticism is not supported empirically, and runs counter to common sense in most respects. A product
manufacturer cannot afford to ignore safety improvements in his
product, because he does so at the risk of being found negligent or
even reckless. Whether he will undertake to develop new products
probably depends more on profit considerations than on concern for
possible tort liability. If a manufacturer decides not to develop a new
product, or to abandon the manufacture of an old one, because of
the safety risks involved and the likelihood of tort liability if the
product is marketed, the decision may well be in the best interests of
the public and the type of decision that tort law is designed to
encourage.
C. Medical Malpractice
The medical malpractice proposal of the Reporters has been considered to be among their more innovative proposals.38 They propose
that doctors be relieved of "the direct financial burden of malpractice insurance by shifting the locus of legal liability from the physician to the hospital or other health care institution connected with
the incident." 39 The "broadest version of this proposal would make
the hospital liable for all the malpractice committed by an affiliated
physician, whether or not the relevant treatment took place in the
hospital."'40 Recognizing the "objections of both principle and practicality" that this proposal would evoke, "including disagreements
over which hospital would be made liable for physician negligence in
the office when the doctor happens to be affiliated with two or more
hospitals," the Reporters conclude that a "more sensible initial approach would be to hold a hospital liable only for physician malpractice that injures patients who are treated within that hospital. 41
Such a rule "would cover roughly ninety percent of the incidents
37. See Brown v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 751 P.2d 470, 245 Cal. Rptr.
412 (1988).
38. See Sugarman, supra note 2, at 1195.
39. 2 ALI STUDY, supra note 1, at 113.
40. Id. at 114.
41. Id.
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now giving rise to malpractice claims and payments. 42
The reasons for this proposal are essentially twofold. One is to
"distribute the cost of malpractice insurance" more efficiently "without having to funnel the premiums through the practice costs of individual doctors. 43 The other is to place the safety incentive where it
may be most effectively administered. "Most malpractice suits are
lodged in connection with momentary inadvertent slips or mistakes
that are hardly influenced by the threat that an adverse tort verdict
may materialize years later." 44 Even in the case of "conscious medical choices about what type or level of precaution to employ," the
doctor "rarely has a financial incentive to skimp on safety" because
"additional tests or more complicated procedures usually entail more
work and income for the doctor. 45
By placing liability on the hospital, the "memory of the institution
can serve to record and piece together patterns in a host of apparently idiosyncratic incidents."' 46 The hospital can "devise feasible
procedures and technologies for guarding against the ever-present
risk of occasional human failure.

. .

for example, by developing ar-

rangements or technology to monitor a patient under anesthesia in
order to detect and avoid sudden oxygen deprivation." 47 The hospital
additionally can use "appropriate personnel management techniques-in selection, training, supervision, discipline and termination-to secure increased levels of care from its employees." 4
The insurance aspect of this proposal is problematic. Considering
the financial instability of many hospitals, large and small, it is
doubtful they would relish picking up the doctors' medical malpractice insurance tab. There is no indication that the overall costs of
insurance would be reduced, and those costs would be passed on to
the consumer whether they are initially borne by the doctor or by
the hospital. The risks, however, would be pooled under a hospital
insurance policy, so that patients would likely bear more or less
equally the insurance costs of high-risk as well as low-risk medical
treatment.
42. Id. This alternative proposal would not relieve doctors of the necessity of carrying liability insurance, since they would still be exposed to claims arising outside of the
hospital context.
43. Id. at 117.

44. Id. at 122.
45. Id.

46. Id. at 123.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 124.

The safety incentive aspects of the proposal are even more problematic. If "inadvertent slips or mistakes" are unlikely to be influenced by the threat of tort liability, nothing will be gained by way of
safety incentive through shifting that liability to the hospital. Concluding that the doctor will never consciously "skimp on safety"
seems unrealistic, because in many situations the patient may not be
able or his insurer may not be willing to pay for expensive tests and
"complicated procedures." Moreover, if there are "feasible procedures and technologies for guarding against the ever-present risk of
occasional human failure," doctors may be as well suited as hospitals
to devise such procedures and technologies.
Considering the reluctance of hospitals today to monitor the safety
practices of their doctors, it seems cavalier to suggest they will effectively increase that monitoring process if the costs of malpractice insurance, which can be passed through to patients, are placed on the
hospitals.
The Reporters recognize that their proposal "may raise the
hackles of physicians and their associations" who view themselves as
"independent professionals who must be free to exercise their own
medical judgment. ' 4 The Reporters dismiss this objection on the
grounds "that it nostalgically evokes a health care world that has
long since passed."' 50 If they are right in this analysis, it is a cause
for dismay rather than pride.
D. Joint and Several Liability
Joint liability has been a potentially charged issue since the "tort
reform" movement of the mid-1980s. A number of states have enacted legislation trenching on the doctrine of joint liability."' The
Reporters recognize that "reforms that have entirely shifted the cost
of a defendant's unavailability and the risk of insolvency to plaintiffs
may have been overreactions to the occasional problem that results
when disproportionate liability is imposed on a single large enterprise
whose actions contributed in a minor way to a plaintiff's loss." 52
The Reporters recommend leaving "traditional joint and several
liability and traditional apportionment rights in place" where "potential co-defendants can contract in advance regarding their apportionment obligations among themselves," because this approach
"might create optimal incentives and be consistent with equitable
49. Id. at 125.
50. Id.
51. See Richard W. Wright, Allocating Liability Among Responsible Causes: A
PrincipledDefense of Joint and Several Liabilityfor Actual Harm and Risk Exposure,
21 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 1141, 1164-68 (1988).
52. 2 ALI STUDY, supra note 1, at 156.
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concerns.""3 They identify three situations where the parties can typically contract in advance: (1) product suppliers in the chain of distribution, (2) hospitals and health care providers practicing in the
hospitals, and (3) generators, transporters, owners and operators of
"waste disposal sites licensed under the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act of 1976 or an equivalent licensing authority."5 4 In all
other cases, the share of losses "for which unavailable or insolvent
defendants would be responsible" would be reallocated "among
available solvent defendants as well as the plaintiff in proportion to
each party's negligence or equitable contribution to the plaintiff's
loss." 55
The Reporters do not clearly explain their policy reason for retaining joint liability where the parties can contract among themselves.
The best explanation offered is their statement that joint liability in
these situations "would create incentives for the execution of contracts that would allocate the burden of liability among potential codefendants, alert the defendants to the risk of insolvency among
their number, and preserve the compensatory benefits to tort victims
of the traditional rule."5 The reason the Reporters think it desirable
to "create incentives" for the execution of contracts allocating the
risk of liability among potential co-defendants is unclear. Presumably such co-defendants are aware of the risk of insolvency among
their number, and need no "incentives" to "alert" them to this risk.
The desirability of preserving "the compensatory benefits to tort victims" that derive from joint liability exists whether or not the potential defendants have contracted for allocation of the risk among
themselves.
Where the defendants are "strangers" to one another, the Reporters would allocate the "losses for which unavailable or insolvent defendants would

be responsible

. . . among available solvent

defendants as well as the plaintiff in proportion to each party's negligence or equitable contribution to the plaintiff's loss." '57 Joint liability would presumably be retained in the case of the plaintiff who was

53. Id.
54. Id. at 157. The proposal for joint liability of doctors and hospitals conflicts
with the Reporters' earlier proposal in chapter 4, volume 2, that liability for medical
malpractice be shifted from doctors to hospitals. See supra note 41 and accompanying
text.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 146.
57. Id. at 157.

free of fault,"' or whose fault was considered de minimus.59
What the Reporters mean by an 'unavailable' defendant is unclear. They may even intend to include immune tortfeasors within
this term. Arguably an immune party should not be considered a
tortfeasor because he has legally been declared not to be a
tortfeasor.
In situations of master-servant and respondeat superior, the question of whether joint liability would be retained arises. Often the
parties would be able to allocate responsibility among themselves by
agreement, although these situations are not necessarily included
within the three categories the Reporters identify as candidates for
such agreements and for the retention of joint liability. Any agreements in the categories listed by the Reporters, as well as in the
employer-employee context, may be subject to problems of inequality
of bargaining position.
Joint liability has been widely retained in the context of respondeat superior. If it were not, tort law would be essentially gutted
because most tort litigation is against corporations that are held vicariously liable on the basis of respondeat superior. Presumably it
would also be retained in indemnity situations, which typically involve vicarious liability of the indemnitee.
Concert of activity among tortfeasors is a classic case for imposing
joint liability. 0° Qui facit per alium facit per se.61 In the case of
intentional tortfeasors, many courts do not apply comparative fault
to reduce the plaintiff's recovery. 2 If the plaintiff is treated as if he
is free of fault for comparative purposes then joint liability should
arguably also be retained.63
The Reporters favor a proportionate reallocation of an unavailable
and insolvent defendant's responsibility between an at-fault plaintiff
and the available, solvent defendant, based on their relative degrees
58. While some states have abolished joint liability entirely, a number retain it
where the plaintiff is found to be free of fault. Carol A. Mutter, Moving to Comparative
Negligence in an Era of Tort Reform: Decisions for Tennessee, 57 TENN. L. REv. 199,

315 (1990). Joint liability would clearly be retained under the Reporters' proposal where
the plaintiff was free of fault and there were two co-tortfeasors, one of whom was unavailable or insolvent, because in that situation the fault of the unavailable or insolvent
tortfeasor would be reallocated only to the solvent co-tortfeasor. See supra note 57 and
accompanying text.
59. Courts commonly do not take into account a plaintiff's negligence when it is
describable as mere inadvertence or inattention. PHILLIPS, supra note 8, at 272. Equating

inadvertence with no fault, joint liability would be retained under the plaintiff no-fault
rule discussed supra note 58.
60. HARPER, ET AL., supra note 30, § 10.1.
61. "He who acts through another acts himself [i.e., the acts of an agent are the
acts of the principal]." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1249 (6th ed. 1990).
62. Mutter, supra note 58, at 277.
63. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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of negligence or equitable contribution to the plaintiff's loss. The Reporters contend that their proposed method of reallocation follows
the procedure "set out in the Uniform Comparative Fault Act
§ 2(d) (1977). ' ' 64 An important difference exists between their proposal and the Uniform Act, however. The Act initially imposes joint
liability on the defendant, with the burden on him to come back into
court "not later than [one year] after judgment is entered." The defendant must show that contribution from a co-tortfeasor is uncollectible and that the co-tortfeasor's liability should therefore be
reallocated among the other at-fault parties.6 5 The Reporters would
apportion liability in the initial litigation with the burden on the
plaintiff to return to court and seek reallocation if a co-tortfeasor
proves unavailable or insolvent. 66
A number of pitfalls are associated with imposing the burden on
the plaintiff to seek recovery from a potential co-tortfeasor if that
tortfeasor is not a party to the initial litigation. The statute of limitations may run before a second suit can be brought. Indeed, the second suit may be barred as a matter of procedure, 67 and even if it is
not, the plaintiff may be bound by the findings in the first suit under
principles of nonmutual defensive collateral estoppel.68

III.
A.

DAMAGES

CollateralSources

Collateral sources are those payments receivable by the plaintiff,
as the result of an accident, from sources other than the tortfeasor
who caused the accident. 69 Under the traditional rule, these sources
are not credited against the liability of the tortfeasor. 70 The reformers would require such a credit.
The Reporters estimate that plaintiffs as a class receive collateral
64. 2 ALI STUDY, supra note 1, at 155.
65. UNiF.COMP. FAULT ACT § 2(c)-(d), 12 U.L.A. 49 (Supp. 1992).
66. 2 ALI STUDY, supra note 1, at 154-55.
67. See David Polin, Annotation, Comparative Negligence: Judgment Allocating
Fault in Action Against Less Than All PotentialDefendants as PrecludingSubsequent
Action Against PartiesNot Sued in Original Action, 4 A.L.R. 5th 753 (1992).
68. See E.H. Schopler, Annotation, Comment Note-Mutuality of Estoppel as
Prerequisite of Availability of Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel to a Stranger to the
Judgment, 31 A.L.R. 3d 1044 (1970).
69. See Sugarman, supra note 2, at 1183-84; JEFFREY O'CONNELL, ENDING INSULT TO INJURY 50 (1975).
70. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A(2) (1979). Payments by cotortfeasors or by those who believe they are co-tortfeasors are not collateral sources. Id.
§ 920A(1).

source benefits equal to approximately fifteen percent of their total
claims.7 1 "The only category of claimants who could be seriously
harmed by a new collateral source offset rule," the Reporters say,
"would be that small minority who had suffered extremely large economic losses."' 72 They recommend that "[a] plaintiff's tort recovery
should be reduced by the amount of present and estimated future
payments from all sources of collateral benefits except life
insurance."73
The lines of debate are clearly drawn on the collateral source rule.
The reformers contend that the plaintiff should not receive double
recovery and that economic efficiency requires that a credit be given.
The traditionalists contend that the collateral source is usually a result of the plaintiff's own prudential efforts, or of persons willing to
help the plaintiff, and that the wrongdoer is not equitably entitled to
the benefit of such sources. 4
A distinction has sometimes been drawn between benefits personally paid for by the plaintiff, and benefits from other sources such as
the government, employers and the like. 75 The argument is that the
plaintiff should receive the benefit of collateral sources he has paid
for personally, but that the tortfeasor should receive a credit for collateral benefits from others payable to the plaintiff. The distinction is
difficult to maintain because the plaintiff usually contributes in part
to group health insurance, unemployment insurance, taxes, and the
like.
Third-party sources often have a subrogation claim against the
tortfeasor to recover any collateral benefits paid to the plaintiff as
the result of an accident. The Reporters would abrogate these subrogation claims. Such a result cannot turn on the prevention of double
recovery, and it undermines basic ideas of contractual entitlement.
Some collateral sources are paid out of charity or goodwill, and
not as a result of contractual obligation. The Reporters make no distinction between these and other collateral sources. As the Australian High Court said in this context:
It would be contrary to the ordinary man's sense of justice, and therefore
contrary to public policy, that the sufferer should have his damages reduced
so that he could gain nothing from the benevolence of his friends or relations or the
7 8 public at large, and that the only gainer would be the
wrongdoer.

The Reporters say that the only category of claimants who would
71. 2 ALI STUDY, supra note 1, at 168.
72. Id. at 174.
73. Id. at 182.
74. See Helfend v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 2 Cal. 3d 1, 465 P.2d 61, 84
Cal. Rptr. 173 (1970).
75. Id.
76. Griffiths v. Kerkemeyer, 139 C.L.R. 161 (Austl. 1977).
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be "seriously harmed" by their proposed offset rule would be "that
''7
small minority who had suffered extremely large economic losses.
The rule discriminates against this small minority of claimants
who,
78
studies show, is significantly undercompensated by tort law.
The Achilles heel of the Reporters' collateral source-offset proposal is that the plaintiff's recovery be reduced by the amount of all
collateral benefits "except life insurance." The Reporters explain:
"Life insurance benefits would be excluded from the new approach,
mainly because such benefits typically do not provide direct compensation for out-of-pocket loss .... Moreover, 'whole life' and 'universal life' insurance contain investment components that should be
returned to beneficiaries without offset."17 9 The phrase "direct compensation for out-of-pocket loss" is meaningless in this context. The
"investment component" of collateral sources supplies the rationale
against offsetting collateral sources in general.80
B.

Workers' Compensation and Products Liability

Arthur Larson called the controversy surrounding indemnity and
contribution against employers in third-party actions "[p]erhaps the
most evenly balanced controversy in all of compensation law. ... "81
The problem arises when a plaintiff employee is injured by workplace machinery and sues the machine manufacturer, who then seeks
contribution or indemnity against the employer, who is often guilty
of negligence in failing to train or supervise the employee. Such
cases arise frequently in products litigation."2
The employee typically cannot sue her employer in tort for workplace injuries, but is statutorily restricted to the exclusive remedy of
workers' compensation. The manufacturer's indemnity-contribution
claim is usually also deemed barred by the exclusive-remedy provision of workers' compensation law. Moreover, the employer has a
subrogation claim against the manufacturer for workers' compensation benefits paid to the employee, usually without regard to consideration of any fault of the employer in causing the employee's
77. Supra note 72 and accompanying text.
78. 2 ALI STUDY, supra note 1, at 174.
79. Id. at 177. The Reporters also say that "certain other forms of coverage, such
as accidental dismemberment policies," could reasonably be exempted from the collateral
offset rule because they "bear a close resemblance to life insurance." Id.
80. Moreover, term-life insurance has no "investment component" in the sense of
cash surrender value.
81. 2B ARTHUR LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 76.11 (1989).
82. 2 ALI STUDY, supra note 1, at 186.

injuries.
The Reporters recommend two solutions to the workers' compensation problem. One is to credit any workers' compensation benefits
received by the employee against any tort recovery from the manufacturer and to eliminate the employer's subrogation claim; the other
is to eliminate the employee's third-party claim entirely, but preserve
"the employer's right to sue the product manufacturer to recover
[workers' compensation] benefits paid for injuries resulting from the
wrongful conduct of a third-party manufacturer. ' 83 The Reporters
express no preference between these alternative proposals.
The first proposal reflects the approach taken in some jurisdictions
where there are co-tortfeasors, one of whom settles: the settlor, relieved from liability, is not subject to any claim for contribution, and
the non-settling tortfeasor receives a credit against her liability in
the amount of the settlement.84 The analogy is imprecise, however,
since the employer is not a co-tortfeasor here and the employer
workers' compensation payment is required by law and is not the
product of a voluntary agreement.
The second proposal is interesting in what it reveals about the role
of fault in the employment context, and the Reporters' reaction to
that role. If the employer should retain a tort remedy against the
manufacturer, the manufacturer should also retain a tort remedy
against the employer where the latter is at fault. Indeed, the employee should retain a tort remedy against her employer where the
latter is at fault. The deterrence and corrective-justice purposes of
tort law apply in all of these situations, as well as in the more common situation where the employee sues the third-party manufacturer
in tort.
C. Pain and Suffering
The centerpiece of the Reporters' damage proposals concerns recovery for pain and suffering. The Reporters conclude that "[plain
and suffering should be retained as a basis of tort damages," but:
[S]uch compensatory damages should be paid only to victims who suffer

significant injuries, with substantial monetary awards paid to the permanently disabled who can use the additional funds to adjust to and better
enjoy life in their future disabled state . .

.

.Meaningful guidelines should

be developed to assist juries in assessing such damages. The guidelines
should be based on a scale of inflation-adjusted damage amounts attached

to a number of disability profiles that range in severity from the relatively
moderate to the gravest injuries. 85
83.

Id. at 197-98.

84. See

UNiF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS AcT § 4, 12 U.L.A. 98
(1975). About twenty states have adopted this act, Svetz for Svetz v. Land Tool Co., 513
A.2d 403 (Pa. 1986).
85. 2 ALI STUDY, supra note 1, at 230.
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Putting aside the difficulty of determining when a person has suffered "significant injuries" so as to justify any award of damages for
pain and suffering, the proposal curiously restricts "substantial monetary awards" for such injuries to those who are "permanently disabled." 8 Thus, no substantial award would be made to one who is
disabled only for a limited time, or to one who suffers no permanent
disability (in the presumed sense of being unable to work), regardless in either case of how severe the pain and suffering might be.
Such substantial damages would be awarded only to the permanently disabled who can use the funds "to adjust to and better enjoy
life in their future disabled state.18 7 Insofar as this proposal contemplates damages only for expenses of rehabilitation, such expenses
should be recoverable separate and apart from damages for pain and
suffering. If the damages are not viewed as an award for expenses of
rehabilitation, then how is a jury to determine whether the funds
"can" be used to "adjust to and better enjoy life"?
Probably the key aspect of the proposal is the call for
"[m]eaningful guidelines" to "assist juries in assessing such damages." The Study is ambiguous as to who would draw up these
guidelines, and what binding effect if any they would have on the
jury in their deliberations.
The proposal for pain and suffering guidelines is an attempt to
impose controls on the jury other than simply by a judicial review
for excessiveness. The proposal reflects an antijury bias, and a search
for certainty where there is none. Moreover, although juries have a
good deal of discretion in the award of damages for pain and suffering, the evidence does not support the conclusion that such awards
are generally arbitrary or excessive in amount. 88
D. Punitive Damages
A great deal of the brouhaha associated with tort reform has been
directed at the award of punitive damages. Yet serious scholarly
studies indicate that such awards are infrequent and not out of line
in amount.8 9 The United States Supreme Court upheld the award of
punitive damages against due process constitutional attack in Pacific
86. Id.
87. Id. at 229-30.
88. See 2 ALI STuDY, supra note 1, 201 n.7.
89. See Steven Daniels & Joanne Martin, Myth and Reality in Punitive Damages,
75 MIN. L. REV. 1 (1990); Michael Rustad, In Defense of Punitive Damages in Product Liability: Testing Tort Anecdotes With Empirical Data, 78 IOWA L. REv. 1 (1992).

Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip.90
The Reporters have several proposals concerning punitive damages. They recommend that these damages be awarded only where
there is clear and convincing evidence of reckless disregard for the
safety of others by "management officials or other senior personnel."
The relevant criteria for assessing punitive damages should be
clearly specified, and should "exclude from consideration . . . the

defendant's overall wealth (while permitting reference to the profits
earned from the specific tortious activity)." "[C]loser judicial scrutiny" of these awards should be mandated, with power in the judge
to bifurcate the trial so as to try the punitive issue separately.
"[S] erious consideration should be given to having the trial judge fix
the actual amount of the punitive award once the jury has found
that such an award is warranted.... Alternatively, and preferably, a

ratio should be established" between the compensatory and punitive
award, "with an alternative monetary ceiling available to permit
higher damages for cases in which especially egregious wrongdoing
happens to inflict only modest harm on a particular plaintiff." In the
case of mass tort claims, a "national mandatory class action procedure should be developed to determine and distribute an appropriate
amount of punitive damages to be awarded for all tort claims arising
out of the defendant's single course of conduct." 91
The call for a clear and convincing standard of proof is unexceptionable, and the adoption of this standard in lieu of a simple preponderance of evidence probably represents the trend. Likewise, the
recommendation of clearly specified criteria, close judicial scrutiny,
and bifurcation are reasonable requirements.
The remaining recommendations are dubious. Restriction of liability to acts of "management officials or other senior personnel" does
not reflect the realities of corporate misconduct, because the ordinary employee on the firing line is often the person responsible for
the corporate misconduct.92 The overall wealth of the defendant is
widely considered to be relevant in determining the amount of damages necessary to punish the defendant. Allowing the trial judge to
fix the amount of punitive damages raises constitutional questions
regarding the right to trial by jury. Any attempted compensatorypunitive ratio or ceiling on the amount of awardable punitive damages suffers from the same problems of arbitrariness and distrust of
juries reflected in the proposals for pain and suffering damages.
90. 111 S. Ct. 1032 (1991). See also TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources
Corp., 113 S.Ct. 2711 (1993).
91. 2 ALI STUDY, supra note 1, at 270.
92. See, e.g., Edwards v. Travelers Ins. Co., 563 F.2d 105 (6th Cir. 1977) (insurance agent); Dorsey v. Honda Motor Co., 655 F.2d 650 (5th Cir. 1981) (research-division employees).
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The proposal for a "national mandatory class action" in the case
of mass tort claims represents an attempt to meet the serious problem of multiple punitive awards for a "single course of conduct."
The problem typically arises in the context of products liability litigation. The proposal creates more problems than it solves, however.
In addition to the difficulty of defining a "mass tort," there are due
process problems in requiring a single proceeding, and states' rights
issues in attempting to preempt state claims in the area. There are
also major choice-of-law problems in administering a national suit.
The approach of the courts to date in meeting the problem of multiple punitive awards has been to allow the defendant to advise the
judge or jury of any prior punitive awards made in connection with
the same conduct.9 3 The offer of this evidence is a two-edged sword,
at least when presented to the jury, because it may be used against
the defendant as evidence of guilt. Its best use may be as evidence
presented to the judge for purposes of "[close] judicial scrutiny of
the size of the verdict."
E.

Attorney Fees

A linchpin of the damages aspect of the Study is the Reporters'
proposal for the award of plaintiffs' attorneys fees in successful
plaintiff litigation. This proposal is seen by the Reporters as a tradeoff for the proposed elimination of the collateral source rule and the
restriction of recoverable damages for pain and suffering. The Reporters suggest that juries award attorney fees today under the guise
of damages for pain and suffering.94 The Reporters also propose that
"[p]rejudgment interest at market rates should be included in damage awards. ' 95 The rationale for these proposals is that "the major
role of tort damages is to reimburse victims for the pecuniary losses
they suffer which are not covered by other forms of loss
insurance." '
The offer-of-settlement feature of the proposal would create a host
of problems. Under that procedure, "once the defendant made a formal offer for settlement, if the rejecting plaintiff did not fare better
(or at least come within a certain range) in the eventual recovery,"
then he would forfeit his right to recover "any legal fees incurred
93.

See, e.g., Hodges v. S.C. Toof & Co., 833 S.W.2d 896 (Tenn. 1992).
STUDY, supra note 1, at 270.
95. Id. at 316.
96. Id. at 315.

94. 2 ALI

after a reasonably short period to consider the offer." '97 This settlement feature would work to the disadvantage of risk-averse claimants, and could create significant conflict of interest problems for the
plaintiff's attorney vis-d-vis his client. The attorney, for example,
may be pressured to settle against her better judgment in order to
preserve her client's entitlement to attorney fees. Even more seriously, the defense may use the attorney-fee item as a bargaining tool
in settlement to attempt to drive a wedge between the interests of
the attorney and her client.
Insofar as the Reporters are concerned that the jury may return
attorney fees in the guise of pain and suffering damages, this risk
could be cured by instructing the jury that the plaintiff is entitled to
recover damages both for attorney fees and for pain and suffering.
The failure of the Reporters to propose this solution may suggest a
bias against recovery of damages for pain and suffering.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Reporters' proposal to abandon the consumer expectations
test and adopt a negligence-like risk-utility standard as the basis for
determining product design defectiveness significantly undervalues
the importance of the consumer expectations test in products liability. Their willingness to abandon strict liability for defects of design,
but not of manufacturing, demonstrates a lack of appreciation for
the close relation between these types of product defectiveness. The
Reporters overlook or disregard the ways in which strict liability
markedly differs from negligence for purposes of determining design
defectiveness.
Their proposals regarding product warnings reflect an antijury
bias that is pervasive throughout the Study. A required use of expert
testimony and a proposed national vocabulary for warnings constitute a repudiation of the ordinary consumer expectations standard
that underlies products liability warning litigation. One of the Reporters' more regressive proposals is their recommendation that compliance with governmental warning standards preempt any claim for
warning inadequacy.
The medical malpractice proposal seems impractical, and unlikely
to be acceptable either to doctors or to hospitals. It is not apparent
that shifting malpractice liability from doctors to hospitals would result in any net cost savings to patients. Nor is it at all apparent that
the shift would result in any greater safety incentives for doctors.
Indeed, considering the general reluctance of hospitals to pursue disciplinary procedures against doctors, removal of tort liability from
97.

Id. at 315-16.

[VOL. 30: 241, 1993]

Comments on Reporters' Study
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

doctors might well bring

about a decrease in medical safety

measures.
The Reporters' proposals on joint liability raise a number of unresolved issues. Why restrict situations for ex ante agreements to the
three categories listed, and what should be done in the likely event of
bargaining inequality? Beyond the ex ante situation, where else will
joint liability be retained? For the innocent plaintiff? For the vicariously liable defendant? For defendants acting in concert, or intentionally? If the Reporters' primary concern regarding joint liability
is the "occasional problem that results when disproportionate liability is imposed on a single large enterprise whose actions have contributed in a minor way to a plaintiff's loss," then why not propose
restrictions on joint liability limited to those "occasional" situations?
The Reporters do not make a convincing case for abolishing the
collateral source rule because they concede the rule should be retained where the "investment components" of life insurance and "accidental dismemberment policies" are involved. Nor are they
persuasive in advocating abolition of the employee's third-party tort
claim while suggesting that the employer's subrogation right should
be retained, or in failing to consider the pros and cons of employee
and third-party tort claims against the at-fault employer. The attorney-fee proposal does not consider the conflict-of-interest problems
involved, or why attorney fees could not be awarded as a separate
item of recovery without regard to limitations on damages for collateral sources and for pain and suffering.
The recommendations regarding punitive damages are regressive.
For example, the "managerial-senior personnel" restriction for vicarious liability awards, the compensatory-punitive ratio, and punitivecap proposals are unrealistic. The constitutional and practical
problems associated with judges fixing the amount of punitive damages, and with the mandatory national class action to determine punitive damages for "mass tort claims," are manifold.
Finally, the Reporters' recommendation that "[m]eaningful guidelines. . .be developed to assist juries" in assessing damages for pain
and suffering" reflects a theme of jury distrust that runs throughout
the study. It also indicates a predilection for certainty and efficiency
that is an ever-present threat to tort law's reasonable person standard for determining corrective justice.

